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Some reflections on the new technologies, the Self and the Otherness 
Giuseppe Iurato (ICMM-SW) 
 
Abstract. In this paper, some reflections, basically having a philosophical and socio-psychological nature 
and concerning the impact of the new technologies on human society, are collected together, basing the 
discussion on the two central social psychology constructs of Otherness and Self. In Part I, we argue on 
human-computer interaction in relation to the concept of Otherness, while in Part II some socio-
psychological aspects of web activities are briefly outlined in relation to the notion of Self . 
 
Part I 
1. Introduction 
Social and human sciences, above all anthropology, social psychology and sociology, all agree in 
considering the interpersonal relations as founding human personality. But, with the coming of ever 
more invasive and capillary technology, new form of interrelations have giving rise, which are quite 
different, in many respects, from the typical interrelations of the usual type human-human, which is 
subsumed in the wider notion of otherness or alterity. Nevertheless, the rising of new technologies 
has however modified a part of this notion of otherness or alterity, that is to say, has entailed an 
extension of it, if one takes into account the new human-computer interaction which, in a certain 
sense, has surely changed the nature and the number of the possible interpersonal relationships.  
  The even more pervasive diffusion of media, has surely repercussions on social influence and this 
fact, on its turn, exerts modifications on the individual traits of character of every single human. 
The influence of media seems even to have effects similar to those exerted by people groups, 
according to a process almost similar to that described by sociology
1
 but that builds up, so to say, a 
digital reality quite different from the one just socially shared as this latter turns out just to be seen 
in a fashion quite distorted from how it really is. The new media have certainly changed structurally 
the social interaction and its field of action, above all lowering the capability to may identify 
spatially the interlocutor with whom one has established a digital communication, so interpersonal 
relation is depauperated in the meaning we assign to such a relation when it is digital. Analogously, 
the concept of presence is radically changed with the rising of the new media of communication.  
  This justifies the use of a new proper denomination for this new way of communication, just said 
to be communication through media, which has its own features that distinguishes it from the other 
ways of communication, providing it of typical meanings, symbols and rules which are quite fluid, 
not rigid, rapidly shared by all the members of the given virtual groups involved in this type of 
communications which therefore now assumes the typical characteristics of a real social process, 
not only as a simple communication way, hence inherent a certain social context, equipped with a 
given symbolic order which is not fixed or rigid, but instead quite fluid and continuously 
changeable but immediately acquired by all the group member just thanks to the rapidity with 
which information circulates among the group interested by this virtual communication process, 
without the rigid constraint of the physical presence of the interlocutors. 
  Anyway, as psychological aspects of every human being are closely depending on the various 
interpersonal relations with which such a social actor is involved, this should be valid too for these 
new communications ways, so it is primary therefore to study this latter question from social 
psychology standpoint. In particular, studies have pointed out above all the sense of freedom, 
irresponsibility and deindividualization, which instead are usually not present in a real material 
presence. At the same time, other features of the personality of every member of the group, might 
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be put in evidence, just for the lowering of those rigid, social rules and schemas which generally 
exert an inhibition. Moreover, social differences may be attenuated, so giving major possibility of 
expression to all the group members. On the other hand, even in these communication modalities, 
social classes and membership categories are not fully eliminated but still persist although in other 
forms of expression
2
. 
  From this, it follows that the concept of Otherness (or Alterity), generally meant as what goes 
beyond individuality, may undergo to changes in relation to these new modalities of 
communication. Therefore, in the next sections, after having previously given a synthetic but 
complete outline of the notion of Otherness, to be meant as a central one in the study of every 
human relationship, we then discuss what might be a neural basis – i.e., mirror neurons system – 
for this concept and, in this framework, what changes may arise in the case of these new modalities 
of digital communication provided by media, also calling into question mirror neurons networks 
just meant as a new type of neural networks simulating motor actions. In particular, since mirror 
neurons are closely involved in the rising of ethic sense and empathy, above all in the real 
(embodied) presence of the Other, we may argue on the possibility to implement the latter 
dimensions (i.e., ethics and empathy) in these new types of communications which, from certain 
standpoints, turn out to be just lacking of these features. 
 
2. Background 
On the basis of the logical models of 19th-century positivism, the psycho-social sciences started to 
interpret psychological phenomena through a pattern centred on the principle of linear causality. 
Along the route of the next 20th-century, a new paradigm gradually arose, this time centred not 
longer on the principle of causality but rather upon the interactive-relational principle, based on the 
new concepts of interaction and relation among human beings, whose study is necessarily 
interdisciplinary
3
.  
  The history of social psychology shows up a crucial turning point when, in the basic axis of the 
dual pair Self-Other – in which every psychological phenomenon was sketched up –  the attention 
was shifted from the pole of the Self (subjectivity) toward the opposite pole of the Other, so opening 
a new direction for social psychology
4
. From this moment onwards, the main theme of social 
psychology is how thoughts, feelings and behaviours of a human being are influenced by the 
objective, implicit or simply imagined presence of others
5
. This gets on well with the main 
assumption that human being is basically a relational subject
6
 who cannot do without being into 
relation with other humans
7
. 
  The basic dual pair Self-Other synthesizes either the individuality (or subjectivity) of each human 
being – in the pole of Self – and her or his relation nature – in the pole of Other. The dual elements 
of this pair are one inseparable of each other and in dialectic relation
8
: for instance, the Self cannot 
arise without individual has to do, in some way, with others
9
, so the social components with which 
every individual gets into contact with others are fundamental to determine the personality of each 
human being
10
.  
  Indeed, all the relations with the Other are just structurally founding for the psychological 
construction of the reality
11
, so that social dimension with the related relations established by each 
individual, play a primary role in building up her or his cognitive processes and her or his personal 
identity
12
. This central task played by social dimensions of the life of every human being has been 
besides highlighted too by sociology, which has pointed out on the coercive role exerted by social 
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institutions on human actions, hence moulding the psyche of people, their subjectivity (so that, in 
this case, the society is considered as a subjective reality), which, collectively considered, give rise 
to a society also considered as a objective reality
13
.   
  On the other hand, the notion of Other is already present in the history of philosophy as well as in 
the history of anthropology as it is an its founding notion
14
. As regard philosophy, then, the notion 
of Other is closely related with that of Otherness or Alterity
15
, which has a proper philosophical 
origin and its early own roots in the deepest meanderings of history of philosophy. The Other is 
furthermore a pivotal concept of psychoanalysis, above all after the work of Jacques Lacan
16
, which 
however started from philosophy. Therefore, it seems that in the philosophical context should be 
searched the early roots of the concept of Other which nevertheless is much wider than the concept 
of Otherness, which is only one out of the many meanings that the notion of Other has in 
philosophy
17
. So that, we now provide a synoptic view of the concept of Otherness or Alterity, as 
meant by philosophy, as it is that meaning of Other which is the nearest to it, and that enables us to 
relate it to the argument of the human-computer interaction, as we shall see in the next section.     
  To be precise, Otherness (or Alterity) refers to the Other, in the sense, to be other, or to put as 
other. It is a more restricted concept than that of diversity, but more extended than that of difference 
(so we have formally the inclusion chain difference   alterity   diversity). This last chain is due to 
Aristotle, in whom thought, as revisited by Medieval philosophy, the term alterity is used in 
opposition either on the one hand to identity, so alterity is also meant as synonymous of diversity, 
on the other hand to unity, so alterity is also meant as synonymous of multiplicity. In the modern 
philosophy, instead, alterity is in reference to all the reality which does not identify with the subject 
(and in this sense, alterity is a concept much nearer to the one of the many meanings of the Other), 
and that, therefore, identifies what is said to be person. Therefore, broadly speaking, alterity refers 
to that is other from what is given: as unity, as identical, as subject, and as person. Thus, 
respectively, alterity: with respect to what is given as one, refers to multiplicity (ontological 
alterity); with respect to the identical, refers to the opposite (logic alterity); with respect to the 
subject, refers to the object (epistemological alterity); and finally with respect to a person, refers to 
the Other (transcendental alterity). So, alterity (or otherness) is a key term of philosophical thought 
in that it constitutively refers always to establishing however relationships among the various, 
possible terms of the being
18
. 
   
3. Possible future research directions 
Recent discovery of mirror neurons opened insightful new directions and perspectives in many 
disciplines. Among these, surely they have provided a neurological basis just for the interpersonal 
relations which characterize human species, so mirror neurons have surely played a central role in 
social sciences and neuropsychology. Mirror neurons are a system of neurons closely related to 
those of brain cortex deputed to movements and actions (mainly, parietal area) and perception. 
Furthermore, it seems that mirror neurons system is also strictly connected with the intentionality 
and meaning of movements, not only to the simply observation of the mechanical action, so that this 
system elaborates both execution of a movement and the related information which is carried out by 
this action. 
  Mirror neurons work mainly at automatic level, so acquisition of mechanical articulation and 
execution’s information are retrieved at unaware level, hence automatically simulated. Furthermore, 
they are able to infer the meaning and aims of an observed action also when this last is only 
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partially observable directly or is not completely performed. Mirror neurons have been also 
associated with the rising and evolution of human language, coming from the communicative 
meaning undergoing motor actions and gestures in higher primates, to which emotional counterparts 
are also associated. This latter hypothesis gets on well with the so-called gestural-motor origin of 
human language, also correlated to the main fact that each time a human being sees the actions of 
another human, her or his mirror neurons system activates, i.e., resonates
19
 with the mirror neurons 
system of the observed human, so that an emphatic relations establishes among them
20
.   
  As already said in Section 1, recently new neural network types have been proposed just based on 
mirror neurons to simulate their functioning and aims applied to robotics and cognitive 
informatics
21
, so it seems not inappropriate to think to implement computationally emotive-affect 
dimensions just by means of such a new type of neural networks based on running of mirror 
neurons systems which are, as has been said above, related with these psychological dimensions 
which, in turn, are closely related to social relationships upon which relies the most typical feature 
of human beings. 
  On the other hand, behaviour recognition and generation processes have one each other a close 
relationship in the human brain, so resent research has shown that human brain understand the 
meaning of behaviour and create symbols through a co-development of recognition and generation 
processes
22
. In (Inamura et al., 2002), it has been proposed a new method just for the integration of 
behaviour patterns and symbols using associative memory in order to realize or achieve the above 
co-development processing into a model where either behaviour recognition and generation process 
are based on a mutual or reciprocal dynamics. The validity of this model has been confirmed, 
together the feasibility of the method, on humanoid simulator.  
  The research on humanoid robots has had a long route along which has accumulated a lot of 
literature. The target of early research efforts was mostly turned to the dynamics, motion planning, 
and control of biped walking, and although it has not yet reached the level of complete solution with 
full of liability and adaptability, the hardware technology has been notwithstanding that established 
for building the autonomous humanoids. The focus of humanoid research has been then extended to 
the research on human-like intelligence, among which is placeable mirror neuron system, found in 
the frontal lobes of humans and primates. Mirror neurons run not only when an individual observes 
a specific behaviour of the others, but also when he or she intends to personally perform the same 
behaviour. Furthermore, mirror neurons are located in neither motor area nor sensory area but rather 
in the Broca’s area which has close relationships with language field. This implies that either the 
behaviour perception and the behaviour generation process might be integrated as an organization 
which has a close relationship with symbolic function (upon which relies also language 
development). 
  In the context of cognitive science, then, the hypothesis of mimesis has also been taken into 
consideration. Mimesis is a primitive form of communicative intelligence closely based on 
imitation, upon which, in turn, learning relies, so allowing understanding the others' behaviours and 
the construction of self-behaviours. Especially, the primates which cannot eliciting speech 
languages can yet perform social communication forms through behaviour imitation. On the other 
hand, the anthropologist Terrence W. Deacon
23
 has put forward the hypothesis that the brain of the 
human being has coevolved with symbol communication, in other words, humans’ high-degree 
intelligence couldn’t be realized without symbolic function. As a result of this, it follows that the 
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origin of human intelligence springs out from the capability of learning by imitation as a 
combination of either behaviour perception and generation. 
  Inamura and co-workers (2002) believe that the theory of integration between behaviour 
perception and generation leads to the breakthrough for the synthesis theory of artificial 
intelligence, like an embodiment of humanoids, symbol grounding problems, and so on. But, 
although many humanoid researches treated the relation of learning by imitation with intelligence, a 
few outcomes have yet been got on the connection of behaviour cognition with behaviour 
performance. In this regard, following this route, Inamura and co-workers have proposed an 
integration model for behaviour perception and generation using Hidden Markov Models, although 
the related mathematical background of this system is quite far from the concept of mirror neurons 
system.  
  Anyway, the work of Inamura and co-workers (2002) has surely provided a mathematical 
framework of mimesis as a computational model of mirror neurons, based on associative memory 
using recurrent neural networks, remarking either advantages and issues of time series data 
recognition and generation just based on associative memory. They have also proposed a novel 
extension method for the associative memory which enables the system to memorize much more 
data and try to decrease the calculation time, also describing and explaining the mechanisms of 
memorization, generation and recognition, with the support of experiments on humanoid simulator, 
hence proposing several improvements in order to may create a suitable computational model of 
mirror neurons which integrates behaviour recognition, generation and memorization, at the same 
time confirming the feasibility of the method through actually implemented framework and 
experiments on a virtual humanoid. 
  Mirror neurons systems, which have been found in humans and even in songbirds as well as in the 
macaque, seem to respond to both the observation and the performance of the same action. It has 
been suggested that their matching response properties have evolved as a phylogenetic adaptation 
for action understanding, and, alternatively, these properties may be arisen through sensorimotor 
experiences. Other recent researches suggest that mirror neuron responses may be modified through 
experience, and that sensorimotor experiences are the critical type of experience for producing 
mirror neuron responses
24
. 
  When an individual observes other people in action, reliably a network of brain regions 
comprehending human premotor, inferior parietal and middle temporal cortex, is activated. In 
particular, frontal and parietal components of this network are those containing most of mirror 
neurons. The function of the human mirror neuron system (in short, MNS) has been deemed to 
mainly concern comprehension and prediction of other people’s actions. This interpretation assumes 
that the participant is primarily a passive observer (as often is, for example, the case during fMRI) 
and ignores two key factors. First, in real life people do not just observe passively but rather 
respond and engage in social interactions. Second, the MNS is mainly embedded within, and 
intimately linked to, the motor system. In this regard, Hamilton (2013) suggests that an important 
purpose of the MNS is not to understand or even to predict, but rather to respond, in real-time and 
in a socially appropriate fashion, to the actions of others
25
. Further, a recent TMS study provides 
exquisite evidence that MNS engagement is driven by social reciprocity (Sartori et al., 2012). 
  Behavioural evidence for a human MNS is largely derived from the studies on automatic imitation 
achieved by Cecilia Heyes (2011). Automatic imitation is nothing but a kind of stimulus-response 
compatibility effect in which the topographical features of task-irrelevant action stimuli facilitate 
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similar, as well as interfere with dissimilar, responses. Behavioural, neurophysiological and 
neuroimaging research on automatic imitation, has revealed that automatic imitation is a covert 
form of imitation, distinct from spatial compatibility, as well as it has indicated that, although 
automatic imitation is subjected to input modulation by attentional processes, and output 
modulation by inhibitory processes, it is yet mediated by learned, long-term sensorimotor 
associations that cannot be altered directly by intentional processes. Automatic imitation provides 
an important tool for the investigation of the mirror neuron system, motor mimicry, and complex 
forms of imitation.  
  Neurophysiology has revealed the properties of individual mirror neurons in the macaque while 
brain imaging reveals the presence of mirror systems (not individual neurons) in the human being. 
Current conceptual models attribute high level functions such as action understanding, imitation, 
and language to mirror neurons, and only the first of these three functions is well-developed in 
monkeys and primates. On the other hand, distinguishing conceptual models on mirror neuron 
function from more detailed computational models, in (Oztop et al., 2006) it is assessed the 
strengths and weaknesses of current computational models in addressing the data and speculations 
on mirror neurons (macaque) and mirror systems (humans). Conceptual models often overlook the 
computational requirements for posited functions, while too many computational models adopt the 
erroneous hypothesis that mirror neurons are interchangeable with imitation ability. So, in (Oztop et 
al., 2006), it is pointed out the gap between conceptual and computational models and underlines 
the research effort required from both sides to reduce this gap.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this contribution, we have first discussed the basic relational nature of human being upon which 
relies the construct of Otherness (or Alterity), hence we have briefly outlined the close relationships 
of it with the neurobiological functioning of mirror neuron systems (MNS), which provide a 
neurological correlate to this construct. On the other hand, affects system of human being has its 
deep neurological correlates just supported by MNS, so we have simply highlighted what 
fundamental role might be played by the latter, if sufficiently implemented computationally (for 
instance, through certain neural networks), in simulating affects in humanoid (i.e., another typical 
feature of human being), hence in trying to build up a kind of kind of virtual Otherness thanks to 
which make human beings even more near or similar to robots or humanoids. In conclusion, we 
simply point out the need to look at mirror neurons systems (MNS) deeper if one wish to try to take 
into account typical affect dimensions of every human being for humanoids. 
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Part II 
 
1. Introduction 
Mirror neurons have been discovered in 1990s and play a crucial role in establishing the close 
relationships between execution and observation of human actions. So, the neural systems of mirror 
neurons allow to put into relationship external actions performed by an another human being with 
the own internal set of actions owned by the observatory, or else, the simply observation of an 
external action executed by a human being activates the same neural circuits simulating its 
execution. Mirror neurons are neurologically placed mainly into the pre-motor cortex area as well 
as into parietal cortex area, and are also related with auditory cortex area; furthermore, such neurons 
are involved in communicative relations and for understanding the intention of an action. They are 
also involved in language processes. Therefore, mirror neurons systems are also closely related with 
intersubjectivity functions
1
, like social cognition and empathy, so that mirror neurons just form the 
neurological basis for the alterity or otherness, which characterizes, by means of resonance 
mechanisms, human beings. Hence, mirror neurons enable simulations of internal states as well as 
imitations of the behaviours of others
2
.   
  Amongst other things, one of the most remarkable and outstanding outcomes of the discovery and 
the study of mirror neurons systems, also in accordance with the pioneering results obtained by 
Gerald M. Edelman and Antònio Damàsio
3
, is the close relationship existing between (personal) 
identity and mirror neurons systems
4
 as well as among affects and mirror neurons systems
5
, hence 
between cognition and mirror neurons systems, when human beings live usually, and mainly, in a 
three-dimensional real environmental space where otherness explicates. But we ask how all this 
does change when human beings interact in a virtual space. In trying to do this, we shall consider 
the Self, which is the wider psychological construct comprising most of the other psychological 
components of human psyche. 
  Indeed, as already Kant had pointed out
6
, the three-dimensionality of usual space-time 
environment is an a priori needed presupposition for the knowledge, which is seriously prejudiced 
by social media. Moreover, just this virtuality of social media world makes very difficult the 
subsistence of the bases of the so-called embodied knowledge and cognition
7
. So, the body with its 
real presence influences considerably the cognition of every human being, so that it is clear that its 
absence, like in the virtual world, has deep and important repercussions for the cognitive 
capabilities of every human being and, in general, for many other aspects of her/his personality
8
.  
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  In what follows, we mainly outline, although briefly, the main concepts of the psychology of Self, 
being, this last, the chief psychological construct that comprehends and unifies the most of the 
psychic components of human psyche, then, we shall try to put into relations the Self with the new, 
fundamental neurological discovery of mirror neurons, highlighting the crucial importance of three-
dimensionality for the right functioning of the systems of these new type of neurons, hence the 
importance of real human contact as they work just rightly, and what consequences are instead 
entailed by virtual worlds just in regard to these systems of new neurons and their close relations 
with human psyche and its deep relational nature (otherness). 
 
2. Background 
In the psychological context, the Self is a general construct whose complexity is due to the many 
components and related meanings which may be assigned to it through the as many numerous 
perspectives from which it may be approached and defined. Anyway, almost all the possible 
definitions of Self, which may be assigned to this construct, agree in seeing in it the basic nucleus of 
personal identity of every human being, which on the one hand refers to impersonal and objective 
reality while, on the other hand, refers to the subjective reality and the personal life experience, that 
is, to the awareness of the own inner world.  
  The psychological construct of Self comes from philosophy and the concepts of soul and spirit, to 
denote the alterity of these latter from the human body. It has been William James to retake this 
philosophical notion, and considers it as denoting that permanent nucleus of personality which 
remains invariant with respect to somatic and psychic changes which characterize individually 
every human being. From this first use of the concept of Self by James, psychoanalysis has 
gradually used this construct in regard to the personality and its main components and aspects, 
above all narcissism and, in general, personal identity and subjectivity. 
  The construct of Self seems to refer to a basic structural, cohesive principle of the whole psychic 
system which harmonizes and unifies its main components; from this perspective, which is also 
retaken by analytical psychology of Carl G. Jung, the Self then becomes a natural and spontaneous 
psychic agency which is often considered as overlapped to self-consciousness. According to Jung, 
the Self is just the place of the psychic totality in which all the psychic affective complexes are 
harmonically tied together and where all the other psychic personal and transpersonal components, 
conscious and unconscious, are then regrouped toward the reaching of final individuation process 
which is the highest level of human psyche, where human being reaches as much highest ethical 
and moral levels. In the history of psychology, however, the construct of Self  has been seen from 
many, various and different perspectives which have led accordingly to as many definitions and 
interpretations, above all falling into social psychology domain. 
  On the other hand, from a more proper psychoanalytic perspective, the virtuality of world wide 
web and its media allows to every user of this net to have a wider possibility to alter own identity 
with a loss of certainty on the real identity of the user, so being able to hidden own identity easier 
with the consequence to make more free and less inhibited the own, various bad narcissistic 
tendencies (like omnipotence, egoism, exhibitionism, perversions, mythomanias, etc.) which – 
being Super-Ego’s barriers quite slack – might go often to detriment of the collective interests and 
of social morality and ethics, with the possibility to reach easier illegality. All this entails a passive 
behaviour and development just of those components of Self strictly involved in the psychological 
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processes establishing relations among humans, hence, in particular, with a consequent inactivation 
of affective psychic components
9
.   
   
3. Possible future research directions 
So, as mirror neurons systems play a truly fundamental role in establishing personality, to be 
precise, its relational aspects (alterity or otherness), the final question we point out is how this main 
function changes or modifies with the even more increasing pervasiveness use of social media, 
hence with the increasing interaction with a not well-known, virtual two-dimensional environment 
rather than operating within a more known, real, usual three dimensional environment. These 
changes obviously will have remarkable repercussions on the personality of each human being 
whose life is, by now, considerably spent into this virtual environment even to may consider a 
specific, new psychic component of human psyche, hence a new component of the Self, having 
directly to do with such a new virtual reality.    
 
4. Conclusions 
We have outlined a brief but complete discussion ranging from mirror neurons systems to the 
psychology of Self and embodied knowledge in the dependence on the possible life environments, 
with particular attention to the real one on the one hand and the virtual one on the other hand. The 
Self is the main psychological construct inherent the personality of every human being, which 
comprehends the main components of human psyche, above all those related to relationships 
(otherness) and affects (empathy), which, in turn, are closely related with mirror neurons systems. 
These latter, then, neurologically work thanks to motricity circuits, hence are fundamentally based 
on three-dimensionality of space and time of the usual, real life environment, dimensions which are 
lost or, however, impaired in a virtual environment like that spanned by social media. So, we 
suppose that the latter, in a certain sense, may compromise or prejudice the basic empathic 
dimension of human relationships, so fundamental and crucial for good, pacific, civil and 
cooperative relations among humans
10
. 
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